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MANIFEST DESTINY AND AMERICAN INDIAN




The area of worship cannot be delineated from social,
political, culture, and other areas of Indian lifestyle, includ-
ing his general outlook upon economic and resource develop-
ment .... [Wlorship is... an integral part of the Indian way
of life and culture which cannot be separated from the whole.
This oneness of Indian life seems to be the basic difference be-
tween the Indian and non-Indians of a dominant society.'
In his statement before the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs, Mr. Barney Old Coyote of the Crow Tribe of Montana
underlined the issues that continue to vex legislative, administra-
tive, and judicial efforts to deal with matters relating to the
religious practices of American Indians. The various tribal reli-
gions practiced by native peoples in the United States are almost
without exception inextricably linked with what non-Indian soci-
ety regards as culture.' This unity of culture and religion makes
American Indian forms of worship alien and difficult for the
non-Indian to understand' and poses difficult questions for
* B.A., 1971, McGill University (Canada); M. Phil., 1976, Yale; J.D., 1982,
University of Pennsylvania. Associate, Davis, Wright, Todd, Riese & Jones, Seattle,
Wash.
1. American Indian Religious Freedom: Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S.J. Res. 102] (statement of Barney Old Coyote, Crow Tribe, Mon-
tana).
2. See, e.g., the remarks of Chief Oren Lyons of the Onondaga Tribe appearing in
the ARTS ADVOCATE, Jan. 1975, at 2, col. 4, and cited in Note, Native Americans Versus
American Museums-A Battle for Artifacts, 7 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 125, 127 (1979):
"Religion, as it has been and is still practiced today on the reservation, permeates all
aspects of tribal society. The language makes no distinction between religion, govern-
ment, or law. Tribal customs and religious ordinances are synonymous. All aspects of life
are tied in to one totality."
3. D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 504 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GETCHES]:
Much of Indian religious life does not include the existence of a church, periodic
meetings, ritual, and identifiable dogma. Instead, there is a pervasive quality to Indian
religion which gives all aspects of Indian life and society a spiritual significance. In pur-
suit of traditional Indian religion, an Indian may feel compelled to relate to nature and
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courts4 that must decide whether certain arguably religious prac-
tices of American Indians lie within the shelter of the free exercise
clause of the first amendment.' Various courts have responded to
this challenge with conflicting conclusions about which American
Indian practices are indeed religious and which are merely expres-
sions of culture or personal preference unprotected by the first
amendment.'
The conquest and oppression of the American Indian tribes by
the white man was a shameful episode in our national history, an
enterprise so unworthy of a nation that holds itself forth as the
champion of liberty and democracy that it is difficult to imagine
any but the most hardened and cynical disciple of manifest
destiny who today would be unwilling to join in the consensus
that regards the treatment of the American Indian by the white
man with shame and horror.7 What is not as widely recognized or
understood, however, is that the lingering effect of oppression
has had a lasting and pervasive impact on Indian religions as they
to others in a particular way. Unfamiliarity with Indian spiritual life and an inherent
suspicion of fraud when religious doctrine and practice are not crisply defined by an-
cient writings or a central authority are obstacles to judicial understanding and protec-
tion of Indian religion.
See also Harris, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act and Its Promise, 5 AM. IN.
DIAN J. 7 (June 1979): "Non-Indians can comprehend worship in a church or synagogue,
but not on a mountaintop or with an eagle feather." See generally FEDERAL AGENCIES
TASK FORCE, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT P.L. 95-341, 8-12 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT] for a thorough and sensitive analysis of the
nature of American Indian tribal religion and its intimate relation (if not identity) with
tribal culture.
4. GETCHES, supra note 3, at 507-08: "the struggle to categorize neatly what In-
dians are moved to do by their traditions ... [illuminates] the difficulty our legal system
has in applying constitutional protections to a strange culture's value system and spiritual
life."
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . ."
6. Compare People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1964) (state law banning possession and use of peyote may not be enforced against prac-
ticing member of Native American Church) with State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d
142 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (state law banning possession and use of peyote
may be enforced against practicing member of Native American Church). Compare
Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (wearing of long hair by Indian is a
religious practice protected against state interference by the first amendment) with New
Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973)
(wearing of long hair by Indian is not a religious practice and is therefore not protected
against state interference by the first amendment). See generally id. (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari); Note, The Right to Wear a Traditional Indian Hair
Style-Recognition of a Heritage, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 105 (1976).
7. See e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-17.
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are practiced today and on the ability of American Indians to
carry on what remains of their religious practices.8 All too often,
ignorance and inadvertence have come to replace the avarice and
malice that formerly inspired government attitudes toward the
American Indian.9 As Senator James Abourezk, Chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, has noted, "[Iln re-
cent years, there have been increasing incidents of infringement
of the religious rights of American Indians. New barriers have
been raised against the pursuit of their traditional culture, of
which the religion is an integral part."' 0 Senator Dewey F.
Bartlett warned that "[w]e do not need to add continued viola-
tion of American Indian religious freedom to the long list of
rights consistently abridged by the Federal government.""
The long history of oppression of the American Indian con-
tinues today. It is a bitter irony that this history makes it increas-
ingly difficult for American Indians to assert successfully the
right to practice their religion free from government interference,
government interference having already so effectively alienated
them from their tribal religions.' 2 Much of this interference has
been incidental to the goals of the legislation or regulation that
has impinged on the religious practices of American Indians, but
the impact is real nevertheless:
A lack of U.S. governmental policy has allowed infringe-
ment in the practice of native traditional religions. These in-
fringements came about through the enforcement of policies
... which are basically sound and which the large majority of
Indians strongly support.... But, because such laws were not
8. T. Pressly, Freedom of Religion for the American Indian in the Twentieth Cen-
tury, in STUDIES IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 285, 294 (R. Johnson ed. 1970): "The total im-
pact of the white man's religion upon the red man is hard to ascertain at this time. Cer-
tainly it has affected and changed many Indian tribal practices and has also driven many
rituals underground."
9. See Native Americans' Right to Believe and Exercise Their Traditional Native
Religions Free of Federal Government Interference: Report to Accompany S.J. Res. 102,
S. REP. No. 709, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 709, 1978].
"Lack of knowledge, unawareness, insensitivity, and neglect are the keynotes of the
Federal Government's interaction with traditional Indians' religions and cultures."
10. Hearings on S.J. Res. 102, supra note 1, at 1.
11. Id. at 7.
12. See GETCHES, supra note 3, at 509:
Perhaps the process [Justice] Douglas [dissenting from the denial of certiorari in New
Rider v. Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097, 1101-1103 (1973)] describes has been so effec-
tive in suppressing Indian culture that traditional practices emerge only in isolated in-
stances, lacking in the consistency that generally marks a religious practice.
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intended to relate to religion and because there was a lack of
awareness of their effect on religion, Congress neglected to
fully consider the impact of such laws on the Indians' religious
practices.
It is only within the last decade that it has become apparent
that such laws, when combined with more restrictive regula-
tions, insensitive enforcement procedures and administrative
policy directives, in fact, have interfered severely with the
culture and religion of American Indians.' 3
This article will discuss two recent appellate court decisions 4
that have had precisely this impact on the religious practices of
two great Indian nations, the Cherokee and the Navajo. In each
case, tribal representatives alleged that the inundation by federal
water projects of sites sacred to the traditional tribal religions was
an unconstitutional infringement of their first amendment right
freely to exercise their religion. In both cases the courts ruled
against the Indians. This article will suggest that the results of
both cases were, in a practical sense, inevitable, though both
courts failed to address the constitutional question raised by the
Indians in a principled and constitutionally defensible manner.
This article will also examine briefly the American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act of 1978,'" raised by both tribes as a statutory
claim, concluding that the statute is no more than a statement of
good intentions and otherwise impotent as an instrument for
righting the constitutional wrongs suffered by American Indians
in their efforts to practice their religion free from government in-
terference.
I. The Cherokee Claim: Sequoyah v. Tennessee
Valley Authority
In 1979 three Cherokee Indians acting as individuals and two
Cherokee tribal organizations jointly petitioned the District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee for an injunction to restrain
the Tennessee Valley Authority from closing the floodgates of
13. S. REP. 709, 1978, supra note 9, at 2.
14. Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 953 (1980) and
Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Badoni v.
Broadbent, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
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Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River.' 6 The TVA's action
would begin the impoundment of water to form the Tellico
Reservoir, flood the valley of the Little Tennessee, and inundate
burial grounds and sites sacred to the followers of the traditional
Cherokee religion.' 7 The lead plaintiff, 78-year-old Ammoneta
Sequoyah, a practicing Cherokee medicine man, testified that the
impoundment of the Tellico Reservoir would destroy the source
of his medicine and make it impossible for him to continue to
practice his traditional religious healing art.' 8 Numerous other
Cherokee affiants testified as to the sacred nature of the lands
scheduled for inundation. '9 However, the court denied plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction and granted defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
16. Writing in the 1978 Supreme Court Review, Martin E. Marty expressed surprise
at how the "snail darter case," TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), had upstaged two im-
portant religion cases the Supreme Court had decided in the 1977-78 term. See Marty, Of
Darters and Schools and Clergymen: The Religion Clauses Worse Confounded, 1978 Sup.
CT. REV. 171 (1978). In TVA v. Hill, environmentalists' concern for the fate of a small
fish had succeeded in blocking the completion of the mighty Tellico Dam project on the
Little Tennessee River. The two religion cases were McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)
and New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977). It is little short of ironic that
the same Tellico Dam project was soon to generate its own litigation grounded in the free
exercise clause of the first amendment.
17. Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
18. Id., Plaintiffs' Memorandum, Exhibit D (Affidavit of Ammoneta Sequoyah):
If the water covers Chota and the other sacred places of the Cherokee along the
River, I will lose my knowledge of medicine.
If the lands are flooded, the medicine that comes from Chota will be ended because
the strength and spiritual power of the Cherokee will be destroyed ....
If this land is flooded and these sacred places are destroyed, the knowledge and
beliefs of my people who are in the ground will be destroyed.
19. See id., Exhibits C-GG, Affidavits of Affiants. Albert L. Wahrhaftig, Chair-
man, Department of Anthropology, Sonoma State University, testified:
In short, to attempt to understand or maintain Cherokee religion without access to
known and significant sites in the 'old country' would be like attempting to understand
and practice Judaism or Christianity without the Book of Genesis. These sites represent
the ultimate foundation of Cherokee belief and practice, now, and for the future.
Emmaline Driver stated: "If they are flooded, our spiritual strength from our forefathers
will be taken away from us, along with the origin of our organized religion. The white
man has taken nearly everything away from us, our heritage, culture, traditions, and our
way of life that is our religion."
Richard Crowe stated:
This land is sacred to me and my people, and it is hard for me to talk about how I feel
about this land.
I have been going to the lands at Tellico for many years, for at least more than
thirty (30) years. Before I went myself, I used to hear my people, my parents, speak of
the land. My people referred to it in the Cherokee language. They said: di ga tale no hr
[in Cherokee script in original]. This means, "This is where WE began."
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be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
after hearing oral argument on the motions.2"
The Tennessee Tellico Dam has had a stormy history.2 Judge
Robert L. Taylor, in his memorandum opinion denying plaintiffs
the injunctive relief they had sought, indicated that since 1966,
when Congress first appropriated money for the construction of
the dam, nine lawsuits have been brought at the district court
level and that progress on the dam had been impeded by two in-
junctions, though the project had been free from injunction for
nine of its fourteen years of existence.22
The Court characterized plaintiffs' claim as follows:
The land. . . which will be flooded ... is sacred to the Cher-
okee religion and a vital part of the Cherokee religious prac-
tices. . . . The plaintiffs contend that impoundment of the
reservoir will violate their constitutional right to free exercise of
their religion, in addition to their claimed statutory rights of
access to lands of religious and historical significance.23
After rejecting plaintiffs' statutory arguments, the court ad-
dressed plaintiffs' constitutional claims.
24
The court assumed that "the land to be flooded is considered
sacred to the Cherokee religion and that active practitioners of
that religion would want to make pilgrimages to this land as a
precept of their religion." ' 2 Nevertheless, it held that the free ex-
ercise clause of the first amendment did not require that injunc-
tive relief be granted to the Cherokee plaintiffs.26 Citing eight
Supreme Court free exercise decisions, the court summarized the
elements of a free exercise claim in two short sentences: "An
essential element to a claim under the free exercise clause is some
form of governmental coercion of actions which are contrary to
religious belief" and "This governmental coercion may take the
form of pressuring or forcing individuals not to participate in
religious practices."
27
20. Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608, 612 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
21. For a history of the controversy generated by the decision to build the Tellico
Dam, as well as a sketch of the historical significance of the region, see TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 156-59 (1978).
22. Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 611.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 612.
27. Id. at 611.
[Vol. 10
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The court first found that the impoundment of the Tellico
Reservoir would have no coercive effect on plaintiffs. Instead of
proceeding systematically to determine if closing the dam would
be a form of "pressuring or forcing individuals not to participate
in religious practices," the court framed the second level of in-
quiry in terms so broad that it effectively encompassed the first
inquiry. "The question thus becomes whether the denial of access
to government-owned land considered sacred and necessary to
plaintiffs' religious beliefs infringes the free exercise clause."
'2
The inquiry thus posed delved no farther than the finding on the
first question.
Having dodged the difficult second question, the court leaped
to a legal non sequitur by holding that the absence of a property
interest in the lands about to be inundated barred plaintiffs from
asserting a free exercise claim in regard to those lands. "The
Court has been cited to no case that engrains the free exercise
clause with property rights.' '29 The second telling question the
court had posited for analysis of free exercise claims remained
unasked and unanswered. In support of its property interest anal-
ysis, the court cited precedent that held that the first amendment
does not grant a right of entry to federal property that is nor-
mally closed to the public.3" The inapt analogy is particularly
troubling when one considers the historical reasons for the
Cherokees' inability to assert a property interest in lands on
which their sacred sites and burial places lie: these former Chero-
kee lands were taken from them by a powerful government bent
on conquest. 3 The court's reliance on this lack of a property in-
terest is an insensitive, inequitable, and irresponsible evasion of
the more difficult constitutional claim that the Indians raised.
28. Id. at 612.
29. Id.
30. Id., citing Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972).
31. "The Cherokee race was removed from Tennessee by the federal government in
a series of political and military steps, but not before the Cherokees had developed deep
religious, cultural and historical ties with their homeland." Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
supra note 18, at 2. These lands are not now closed to the public. When they were in
private hands, plaintiffs had no difficulty in gaining access to them. They will now be
closed to the public only because government action will cause them to be inundated.
Thus, the court's analogy to prison and military reservation cases in which plaintiffs
sought to establish a first amendment forum in a place where none had been previously
available to them or to others, and where reasonable time, place, and manner regulation
would not permanently or substantially impair the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right, does not persuade. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Fowler
v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, af-
firmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for injunc-
tive relief. Because the district court had considered matters out-
side the pleadings, the court of appeals treated the district court's
judgment granting defendant's motion for dismissal as one for
summary judgment.3 2 The appellate court, however, explicitly re-
jected the district court's holding that plaintiffs could not assert a
first amendment claim to enjoin TVA from flooding the sacred
valley because plaintiffs had no property interest in the lands that
would be flooded. 3 The court of appeals then analyzed the
troubling question avoided by the district court-whether the ac-
tion of the Tennessee Valley Authority, in flooding land con-
ceded to be sacred to the Cherokee, "pressur[ed] or forc[ed] in-
dividuals not to participate in religious practices."
'3 4
The court began its inquiry by setting forth evidence in the
record that tended to show that the claims of the plaintiffs were
cultural rather than religious,3" implicitly accepting the dubious
assumption that Indian culture may be distinguished from Indian
religion.16 The court concluded from the more than twenty af-
fidavits submitted in support of plaintiffs' motion for injunctive
relief that plaintiffs' claims were fundamentally cultural rather
than religious. 7 A careful reading of the affidavits, however, sug-
gests that the court summarized carefully selected portions in
order to undercut the religious foundation of plaintiffs' claim.3
The court's strategy is clear: to address the free exercise question
raised by plaintiffs and effectively ignored by the trial court, yet
still affirm the trial court's judgment, it would have to show that
plaintiffs' claims did not satisfy the constitutional standards for
determining whether a belief is religious. The court erroneously
assumed that characterization of plaintiffs' claims as cultural as
32. Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
33. Id. at 1164: "While this [lack of a property interest] is a factor to be considered,
we feel it should not be conclusive in view of the history of the Cherokee expulsion from
Southern Appalachia followed by the 'Trail of Tears' to Oklahoma and the unique nature
of plaintiffs' religion."
34. Sequoyah, 480 F. Supp. at 611, citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
Compare supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
35. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162: "the documents in the record indicate that the
Cherokee objections to the Tellico Dam were based primarily on a fear that their cultural
heritage, rather than their religious rights, would be affected by flooding the Little Ten-
nessee Valley."
36. Compare supra text accompanying notes 1-12.
37. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162.
38. Sequoyah, 480 F. Supp. 608, Plaintiffs' Memorandum, Exhibits C-GG.
[Vol. 10
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well as religious would place them beyond the bounds of the free
exercise clause. But the Supreme Court has never held that a
belief must be exclusively religious in order to qualify for first
amendment protection.39
The court's emphasis on the nonreligious element of plaintiffs'
claims could not wholly obscure their religious content. 0 Forced
to acknowledge a religious component, the court shifted its ap-
proach in an attempt to minimize the significance of that compo-
nent by trivializing it.4" A misreading of the affidavits submitted
to the trial court buttressed that trivialization. 2 Having rendered
plaintiffs' claim a hybrid of culture and religion, the court ven-
tured into an area it mistakenly believed constitutionally gray. It
conceded without discussion that plaintiffs had met the threshold
requirements that they did in fact have a religion and that they
sincerely adhered to it. 3
"Centrality". A Spurious Constitutional Test
The court opened its analysis of the constitutional question by
asserting that Sherbert v. Verner44 and Wisconsin v. Yoder45 re-
quired a two-step analysis in evaluating a free exercise claim.
First, it must be determined whether the governmental action
does in fact create a burden on the exercise of the plaintiff's re-
39. See Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 684 (9th Cir. 1981).
40. See supra text accompanying note 25.
41. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162-63: "The Cherokees who are plaintiffs in this action
obviously have great reverence for their ancestors and believe that the places where their
ancestors lived, gathered medicines, died and were buried, have cultural and religious
significance. Similar feelings are shared by most people to a greater or lesser extent."
(Emphasis added.)
42. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163:
There is no showing that any Cherokees other than Ammoneta Sequoyah and
Richard Crowe ever went to the area for religious purposes during [the 100 years prior
to TVA's acquisition of the land] . . . . At most, plaintiffs showed that a few
Cherokees had made expeditions to the area, prompted for the most part by an under-
standable desire to learn more about their cultural heritage.
Compare notes 18 and 19 supra. Indeed, the failure of plaintiffs' affiants to satisfy the
court may well be simply a matter of felicity of language because it is particularly difficult
to express the religious nature of an experience in words that convey clear meaning to
someone who has not shared that experience. This predicament intensifies when the other
sees the religious experience as something that corresponds more closely to his notion of
culture than of religion. In this regard, consider the remarks of GErCHEs, supra note 3.
43. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163.
44. 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
45. 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972).
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ligion. If a burden is found it must be balanced against the
governmental interest, with the government being required to
show an overriding or compelling reason for its action."
This first step assesses the "quality of the claims"" 7 for which
litigants are seeking free exercise protection.
In addressing this first question, the court relied on language in
Yoder 8 and two state cases, Frank v. Alaska49 and People v.
Woody,5" to support its thesis that even if plaintiffs' claims were
religious, they were not entitled to free exercise protection unless
the disputed practices were central to the religion."' None of the
cases, however, provides solid authority for the court's "central-
ity" test. Initially, simply on its facts, it is hard to see how the
claim raised in Yoder can be said to be more "central" (and thus
more religious for free exercise purposes) than the claim of the
Sequoyah plaintiffs. In Yoder, unlike Woody, the court dealt
with practices that were not worship or religious ritual. These
practices could be seen as religious only by indulging in a gener-
ous and lengthy implicit syllogism: the survival of the Amish
religion depends on the successful inculcation of Amish values in
each new generation; if Amish children attend public school, they
may fail to acquire sufficient Amish values so as to make them
adhere to the faith; if young people do not adhere to the Amish
faith, the Amish religion will not survive; therefore, inculcation
of Amish values is a central tenet of the Amish religion. As this
syllogism makes clear, the Yoder "centrality" test offered by the
Sequoyah court is spurious at best. The truly central tenets of the
Amish faith concern matters of ritual and faith, not the practical
problems of guiding children through adolescence.
In contrast, the Sequoyah plaintiffs have asserted a much
46. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163.
47. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
48. Id. at 215-16: "[For the Amish, religion and life-style are] ... inseparable and
interdependent . . . .The traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group,
and intimately related to dally living."
49. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
50. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
51. The court might also have relied on language in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406, to
support its "centrality" argument, as there the Supreme Court found that Sherbert's
belief that she could not work on Saturdays was "a cardinal principle of her religious
faith." However, Sherbert did not establish a "centrality" rule. The Sherbert Court used
"centrality" as useful evidence of sincerity; in Sequoyah, the court has readily conceded
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stronger claim to religious centrality. Their claims concern the
home of their gods and the ultimate origins of the Cherokee peo-
ple. Surely the Yoder claims are more "cultural" than those
presented in Sequoyah. Moreover, if the Cherokee practices are
no longer "intimately related to daily living ' 52 except for a few
devoted believers, it is only because the government, which now
seeks to reject the Cherokee claims as not sufficiently central to
the Cherokee faith to qualify for first amendment protection, had
in the past systematically worked to deprive the Cherokees of
their connection with the land and their sacred religion, which
has always been tied to the land. It is remarkable that the
Cherokee religion has survived at all, given the powerful forces
historically arrayed against it.
The Woody53 and Frank"4 courts found that certain practices
of American Indians fell within the ambit of the free exercise
clause. The Sequoyah court, however, used these cases not for
their holdings but for their negative implications. Woody was a
ground-breaking case. It recognized a free exercise exemption
from a state ban on the use of peyote by a religious minority, the
Native American Church, thus expanding free exercise thinking
to encompass non-mainstream religions. Nevertheless, the
holding was clearly a logical consequence of the Sherbert" deci-
sion.
Because the use of hallucinogenic drugs is a far more con-
troversial issue than, say, the right to unemployment benefits
claimed in Sherbert, the California court was careful to couch its
opinion in narrow terms in order to preclude all but the strongest
claims from staking out territory within the exemption. The Se-
quoyah court correctly remarked that Woody found peyote to
"play a central role in the ceremony and practice of the Native
American Church," that the peyote ceremony comprised "the
cornerstone of the religion," 5 6 and that "'[tlo forbid the use of
peyote is to remove the theological heart of Peyotism."'" A
degree of "centrality" equal to that of the practice examined in
Woody should not be a necessary condition to a finding that a
religious practice falls within the shelter of the free exercise clause
of the first amendment, particularly in a case not involving the
52. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
53. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2dc 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
54. Frank, 604 P.2d 1068.
55. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
56. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
57. Id., citing Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
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controversial use of hallucinogenic drugs. Woody does not
foreclose the possibility of a lower standard of significance for
the protection of less controversial religious practices against
secular interference.
58
Frank v. Alaska59 poses even more difficult problems for the
Sequoyah court. In Frank the Alaska Supreme Court held that an
Athabascan Indian was not subject to prosecution under the state
game laws for taking a moose out of season in order to provide
food for a traditional funeral feast. 6" The court found that
"[w]hile moose itself is not sacred, it is needed for proper obser-
vance of a sacred ritual which must take place soon after death
occurs. Moose is the centerpiece of the most important ritual in
Athabascan life and is the equivalent of sacred symbols in other
religions." 6' The eating of moose meat at a funeral feast appears
no more centrally religious than worshipping and gathering tradi-
tional medicinal plants at the site of the origin of the Cherokee
people and their religion.
Furthermore, although Frank speaks in the language of "cen-
trality," it clearly does not require "centrality" as a necessary
condition to free exercise protection. The Frank court cited a
1975 Eighth Circuit opinion, Teterud v. Burns,62 as sole federal
authority speaking directly to the "centrality" issue. The Teterud
court stated:
The appellant's argument appears to be premised on the theory
that Teterud was required to prove that wearing long braided
hair was an absolute tenet of the Indian religion practiced by
all Indians. This is not the law. Proof that the practice is
58. See Note, Dubious Intrusions-Peyote, Drug Laws, and Religious Freedom, 8
Am. INDIAN L. REV. 79, 95 (1980). The student commentator suggests that the Woody
"centrality" standard is constitutionally suspect and a dead end for future free exercise
claims. The commentator argues that "present attitudes and legal standards constitute a
distortion of first amendment religious liberties . . ." because the Woody "centrality"
test sanctions intervention into religious life and freedom. The commentator contends
that courts would better serve first amendment values if they followed Justice Jackson's
advice "[to] have done with this business of judicially examining other people's faiths."
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, suggests the commentator, if the Yoder family's "life-style," 406 U.S.
at 215, is sheltered by the free exercise clause of the first amendment, so too is American
Indian culture. Indian religion and culture are at least as closely interrelated as the
religion and culture of the Amish."
59. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
60. Id. at 1073.
61. Id.
62. Id., citing Teterud, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
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deeply rooted in religious belief is sufficient. It is not the pro-
vince of government officials or court to determine religious
orthodoxy. 63
The Sequoyah court dismissed Teterud as arising in an inap-
posite factual context not applicable to Sequoyah." However, it
failed to explain how Teterud differs conceptually from Yoder,
Woody, Frank, and Sequoyah.65
The court found that the Little Tennessee River valley was
neither the "cornerstone" nor the "theological heart" of the
Cherokee religion. Because the Cherokee plaintiffs established
neither the "centrality or indispensability" of the valley to the
practice of their religion nor the inseparability of their religious
practices from their way of life, the court held that they failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted under the free ex-
ercise clause of the first amendment. 66 The court found that
plaintiffs had instead merely stated a "personal preference" that
did not rise to constitutional dimensions:
The overwhelming concern of the affiants appears to be related
to the historical beginnings of the Cherokees and their cultural
development. It is damage to tribal and family folklore and tra-
ditions, more than particular religious observances, which ap-
pears to be at stake. The complaint asserts an "irreversible loss
to the culture and history of the plaintiffs." Though cultural
history and tradition are vitally important to any group of peo-
ple, these are not interests protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. 67
To the contrary, the affidavits that plaintiffs provided to the trial
court6" demonstrate that their concern was primarily and pro-
63. 522 F.2d at 360.
64. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163 n.2: "Typically they concern some official regula-
tion of individual activity which infringes the right of a particular group or person to the
free exercise of religion. E.g., Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (prison
regulation against long, braided hair)."
65. Recent decisions confirm that the "centrality" test plays no part in free exercise
analysis. See, e.g., Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981) (religiously based ob-
jection to Social Security numbering as a condition of qualifying children for public
assistance sustained); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981)
(statutory rule of accommodation permitting religionists to pay equivalent of union dues
to charity not a violation of the establishment clause) (implicit free exercise grounding of
statutory exemptions).
66. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164-65.
67. Id.
68. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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foundly religious. 69 Further, even assuming that the court was
correct on the facts, it was wrong on the law. There is no author-
ity for its assertion that, in order to merit the protection of the
free exercise clause of the first amendment, a religious practice
must have its source exclusively in religious belief.70 The
Cherokee plaintiffs thus failed to pass the "quality of the claims"
test, which the court set forth as the first of two steps in analyz-
ing free exercise claims.7" The court concluded that "plaintiffs
have not alleged infringement of a constitutionally cognizable
First Amendment right."' 2 Since plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
first step of the analysis, the court did not consider the second,
the balancing test: "In the absence of such an infringement, there
is no need to balance the opposing interest of the parties or to
determine whether the government's interest in proceeding with
its plans for the Tellico Dam is 'compelling.' "v' On this basis, the
court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying plaintiffs' mo-
tion for injunctive relief.74
II. The Navajo Claim: Badoni v. Higginson
Rainbow Bridge National Monument is a 160-acre tract in
southern Utah, entirely surrounded by the Navajo Indian Reser-
vation. Within this tract is a remarkable sandstone arch, 309 feet
high and spanning 278 feet, sacred to Navajos who adhere to the
traditional tribal religion.7" Glen Canyon Dam, located fifty-eight
miles below the sandstone arch on the Colorado River, was com-
pleted in 1963. The waters rising behind the dam to form the
Lake Powell Reservoir have risen to reach the Monument. When
the Lake Powell project is complete, there will be forty-six feet of
water underneath the Bridge. Under the supervision and manage-
ment of the National Park Service, boating facilities have been
supplied to assist tourists in visiting the Monument as part of the
69. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
70. See Callahan, 658 F.2d 679 and text accompanying note 42 supra.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
72. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165.
73. Id.
74. Judge Merritt dissented only on the ground that the case should be remanded for
"plaintiffs to offer proof concerning the centrality of their ancestral burial grounds to
their religion." Id. Judge Merritt fully accepted the "centrality" test and the majority's
reasoning; he simply believed that summary judgment was not an appropriate resolution
of this matter in which the record indicated that the factual matter of the "centrality" of
plaintiff's religious practice allegedly infringed by the closing of the dam was in dispute.
75. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
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Park Service's operation of the adjacent Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area.76
In 1974 eight individual Navajos, three of them medicine men
recognized by their people, brought suit to enjoin the Bureau of
Reclamation, the National Park Service, and the Department of
the Interior from continuing to act in such a manner as to destroy
and desecrate the Navajo gods and sacred sites threatened by the
rising waters of Lake Powell and by the influx of tourists." The
Navajo grounded their principal claim in the free exercise clause
of the first amendment.78 Intervening as defendants, agencies of
the states of Utah and Colorado moved for judgment on the
pleadings. The court treated the motion as one for summary
judgment and granted it."9
The pleadings of the Navajo plaintiffs set forth an elaborate
ground for their first amendment claim for injunctive relief.8"
However, the court dismissed plaintiffs' claims on two alternative
grounds.' First, the court found that plaintiffs had no property
interest in Rainbow Bridge National Monument and held that this
lack of a property interest was dispositive of plaintiffs' claims. It
cited no authority for the holding, stating only that "[tihe court
feels that the lack of a property interest is determinative of the
First Amendment question and agrees with defendants that plain-
76. Id. at 175.
77. Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977).
78. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. In addition, the Navajo raised two statutory issues not
pertinent to the present discussion. See Badoni, 455 F. Supp at 643 (violations of the Col-
orado River Storage Project Act and of the National Environmental Policy Act).
79. Badoni, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977).
80. Id. at 643-44:
Certain geological formations in the Rainbow Bridge area have held positions of
central importance in the religion of the Navajo people.., for at least 100 years. These
shrines, which are regarded as the actual incarnate forms of Navajo gods, have per-
formed protective and rain-giving functions for generations of Navajo singers.... Plain-
tiffs allege that the flooding of Bridge Canyon in the vicinity of Rainbow Bridge and
the greatly increased tourist traffic due to defendants' actions have resulted in the
following specific infringements upon plaintiffs' First Amendment rights: the destruc-
tion of holy sites; the drowning of entities recognized as gods by the plaintiffs; preven-
tion of plaintiffs from performing religious ceremonies; desecration of holy sites,
especially abodes of gods of the plaintiffs, by tourists; and, by virtue of all of this, in-
jury to the efficacy of plaintiffs' religious prayers, and entreaties to their remaining
gods ... Plaintiffs request this court to order defendants to take appropriate steps to
operate Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir in such a manner that the important religious
and cultural interests of plaintiffs will not be harmed or degraded, and to issue rules
and regulations to prevent further destruction and desecration of the Rainbow Bridge
area by tourists.
81. Id. at 644.
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tiffs have no cognizable claim under the circumstances
presented." 82 The court held out as persuasive a hypothetical sit-
uation proposed by defendants that involved a plaintiff who peti-
tioned a federal court to restrict public access to the Lincoln
Memorial because he had had an intense religious experience
there.13 The facile acceptance of defendants' hypothetical situa-
tion, however, ignores the difference between the claims of
American Indians seeking to protect their religion and the situa-
tion described in the hypothetical. The Indians sought to vin-
dicate old claims on territory that was once theirs for a religion
that has its roots in the very origins of the Indian people; the Lin-
coln Memorial litigant could make no such claim. Recognition of
the Navajo plaintiffs' first amendment claims would not have re-
quired a judgment in favor of defendants' hypothetical plaintiff.
8 4
The court then presented an alternative ground of decision. Its
cramped view of the free exercise test required by Yoder,8" the
difficulty of dismissing as nonreligious a claim that is on its face
religious, and the superficial analysis and casual use of language
in its first ground of decision led it into logical difficulties from
which it failed to extricate itself.
The court began its analysis with the following statement:
"[E]ven if plaintiffs' claims were cognizable First Amendment
claims ... the interests of defendants would clearly outweigh the
interests of plaintiffs."8 6 The court believed that even if plaintiffs
82. Id.
83. Id. at 645.
84. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-12, for an analysis of the nature of
the belief structure of American Indian religions. Defendants' analogy to an individual's
spontaneous and contemporary religious experience is inappropriate, see id. at 88-98,
although as a hypothetical case, it admittedly does raise troubling first amendment ques-
tions.
Id. at 12 states:
When the freedom of religion is discussed in the context of the tribal traditions, it is the
right to adjust to and maintain relationships with the natural world and its inhabitants
that is addressed .... The ceremonies and rites themselves set fairly precise rituals and
reveal in the performance of the acts their continuing efficacy. While no future revela-
tions can be ruled out, it would be the rarest of events for a new ceremony to be in-
troduced. Except in the most remote areas of Indian country, the urbanization of
North America has precluded both Indian and non-Indian from the constant relation-
ship with the natural world that would be conducive to the revelation of further
ceremonies.
85. 406 U.S. at 214.
86. Badoni, 455 F. Supp. at 645.
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had been found to have standing under the property interest test,
the religious claims they advanced were clearly outweighed by de-
fendants' interests. However, the court then undercut the logic of
this analysis by finding that plaintiffs' claims failed to pass the
Yoder "centrality" test and therefore were not religious claims
worthy of first amendment protection:
It is apparent that these interests do not constitute "deep
religious conviction[s], shared by an organized group and in-
timately related to daily living .... .8 [T]here is nothing to in-
dicate that at the present time the Rainbow Bridge National
Monument and its environs has [sic] anything approaching
deep, religious significance to any organized group, or has in
recent decades been intimately related to the daily living of any
group or individual.
Plaintiffs fail, however, to demonstrate in any manner a vital
relationship of the practices in question with the Navajo way of
life or a "history of consistency" which would support their
allegation of religious use of Rainbow Bridge in recent times.
In sum, the alleged interests of plaintiffs have not been
established."
Applying the "deep religious significance," "intimately related to
daily living," and "vital relationship" standards of Yoder, the
court purported to hold that the Navajo lost the balancing test,
when in fact it had held that the Navajo had not stated a religious
claim under the free exercise clause. In support of its findings,
the court pointed to two dispositive facts: first, the plaintiff
medicine men were not "recognized by the Navajo Nation as
such," their training was not "tribally organized," and it took
place years ago; and second, the ceremonies were held too infre-
quently to qualify for constitutional protection. 9 The first asser-
tion, however, was explicitly contradicted by a prior finding of
the court90 and, in any case, is meaningless when the relationship
between tribal government and tribal religion is properly under-
87. Id., citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
88. Id. 455 F. Supp. at 646.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 642: "Three of the individual plaintiffs are qualified and recognized
among their people as medicine men-i.e., religious leaders of considerable stature among
the Navajo, learned in Navajo history, mythology and culture, and practitioners of tradi-
tional rites and ceremonies of ancient origin."
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stood.9" The second assertion may be of some significance when
considering a religious claim within the mainstream Judaeo-
Christian tradition, but it is irrelevant when applied to traditional
religions of the American Indian.92
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief
and grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment.
However, it substituted for one of the district court's alternative
grounds of decision one of its own.93 The court cited Sequoyah to
support its rejection of the district court's conclusion that the
Navajos' lack of a property interest in the Monument denied
them standing to claim free exercise protection. Further, the
court implicitly rejected the notion that Yoder required the ap-
plication of a "centrality test" 9 to free exercise challenges to
government activity." The court did not attempt to demonstrate,
91. See, e.g., Hearings on S.J. Res. 102, supra note 1, at 242-43 (letter of Rev. Caleb
Holetstewa Johnson, Personal Representative, Hopi Traditional Kikmongwis, Feb. 21,
1978):
On many reservations there are two group [sic] of Indians. On the one hand, there are
the progressive Indians who are active in the Tribal Councils. On most reservation [sic],
they have nothing to do with traditional Indians .... In fact, on the Hopi reservation,
it is the progressive tribal council which is making problems for the Traditional Hopis.
It is the progressive tribal Council who is breaking down and interfering with the Hopi
traditions and customs ... the so-called progressives ... in most cases, know nothing
about the traditional ceremonials and traditional rites of the Indian Tribes.
See also S. REP. 709, 1978, supra note 9, at 5:
It is the intent [of Congress in enacting the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act] that that source [of information concerning Indian religious practices] be the prac-
titioner of the religion, the medicine people, religious leaders, and traditionalist [sic]
who are Natives-and not Indian experts, political leaders, or any other nonpracti-
tioner.
92. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-11:
The tribal religions do not incorporate a set of established truths but serve to
perpetuate a set of rituals and ceremonies which must be conducted in accordance with
the instructions given in the original revelation of each particular ceremony or ritual ....
Unlike the larger religions, the ceremonial year did not commemorate specific
chronological historical events, and some ceremonies were reserved for occasions that
warranted them. Not all ceremonies needed to be performed each year in the manner
that the Christian year follows the life and passion of Jesus, for example.
93. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
94. Id. at 176-77.
95. Id. at 176:
At the outset, we reject the conclusion that plaintiffs' lack of property rights in the
Monument is determinative. The government must manage its property in a manner
that does not offend the Constitution. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th
Cir. 1980) (lack of property interest not conclusive, but is a factor in weighing free ex-
ercise and competing interests).
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as had the district court,"6 that the Navajo claims were not suffi-
ciently "central" to qualify for first amendment protection, but
rather held directly that "Rainbow Bridge and a nearby spring,
prayer spot and cave have held positions of central importance in
the religion of some Navajo people living in the area for at least
100 years."
'9 7
The court then applied the balancing test mandated by Yoder9
to the first of two injuries alleged by plaintiffs. Without extensive
analysis, the court found that "the government's interest in main-
taining the capacity of Lake Powell at a level that intrudes into
the Monument outweighs plaintiffs' religious interest . . . . In
these circumstances we believe the government has shown an in-
terest of a magnitude sufficient to justify the alleged infringe-
ments." 99 The court saw no delicate balance. The interests of an
entire section of the nation in managing scarce water resources
simply could not be overborne by religious claims of American
Indians.
Plaintiffs had also contended that the National Park Service's
inadequate regulation of tourist behavior had infringed the free
exercise of their religion. They sought "some measured accom-
modation" 00 by means of regulations to control the behavior of
tourists at the Monument and thereby reduce the injury done to
the Monument itself and to their religious practices. The court ac-
cepted that tourists had "desecrated [the Monument] by noise,
litter and defacement of the Bridge itself."'0 1 After briefly
surveying several free exercise cases, it decided that the rule of ac-
commodation of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 10 2 Wooley v. Maynard,'
0 3
McDaniel v. Paty,'14 and Sherbert v. Verner'°0 did not require the
government here to take special steps because it "has not pro-
hibited plaintiffs' religious exercises in the area of Rainbow
Bridge; plaintiffs may enter the Monument on the same basis as
other people."' 06 To the contrary, the court found that any gov-
ernment initiative to control the behavior of tourists to the
96. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
97. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177 (emphasis added).
98. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
99. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
100. Id. at 178, citing Appellants' Brief at 8.
101. Id.
102. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
103. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
104. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
105. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
106. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 178.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Monument for the benefit of the Navajo in the exercise of their
traditional religion would run afoul of the establishment clause of
the first amendment.'
0 7
The court supported its argument by noting that regulation of
tourist behavior in order to protect Navajo religious practices at
the Monument would infringe the right of the public to use the
Monument for its own purposes.108 The case law upon which the
court relied to reach these two conclusions points consistently to
contrary propositions. In support of its conclusion that there was
danger of an establishment clause violation, the court cited only
one case, School District of Abington v. Schempp. 0 9 The court
there held that "there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.'"1 For
the proposition that the public had a right of access that may not
be regulated for the benefit of an individual's free exercise rights,
the court cited a line of cases that stands for a precisely contrary
conclusion."' The sections that follow will discuss each of these
conclusions.
The Establishment Clause Misapplied
Government defendants have traditionally raised the establish-
ment clause as a defense to free exercise claims." 2 However, re-
cent jurisprudence suggests an integrated view of the two religion
clauses of the first amendment that would posit the common goal
that all religions prosper or decline without the help or interfer-
ence of government. The two religion clauses should not operate
as a system of checks and balances, one upon the other. Chief
107. Id.: "But what plaintiffs seek in the name of the Free Exercise Clause is affirm-
ative action by the government which implicates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment."
"Issuance of regulations to exclude tourists completely from the Monument for the
avowed purpose of aiding plaintiffs' conduct of religious ceremonies would seem a clear
violation of the Establishment Clause . . . . Were it otherwise, the Monument would
become a government-managed religious shrine." Id. at 179.
108. "Exercise of First Amendment freedoms may not be asserted to deprive the
public of its normal use of an area .... We must also deny relief insofar as plaintiffs
seek to have the government police the actions of tourists lawfully visiting the
Monument." Id.
109. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
110. Id. at 222.
111. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179.
112. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
638 (1978); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963).
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Justice Burger has recognized that such a view requires the
resolution of apparent conflict between the two clauses:
The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a
general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run
afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be
allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be
to the protection of values promoted by the right of free exer-
cise. I II
The Court has recognized that at least since Everson v. Board of
Education, 114 government may provide religious institutions with
the basic services normally available to all other citizens without
compromising establishment clause values.' 15 In the present case,
Navajo plaintiffs sought protection from damage and desecration
of a religious site located on federally managed land. Had the
Navajo requested the same measures in order to protect an esthe-
tic, economic, or ecological interest, the government would have
had unquestioned authority to act. Yet the Badoni court held that
the establishment clause barred the government from acting to
protect a landmark geological structure simply because religious
beliefs motivated the Navajo plaintiffs. Indeed, the Navajo plain-
tiffs did not actually seek affirmative government action on their
behalf. Rather, they sought only that the government take steps
to minimize the destructive impact of its management policies. In
effect, the Navajo plaintiffs sought not to have their religion
favored by government action, but only to have the impact of
hostile government action reduced. 6
The Supreme Court has consistently found that affirmative
government action which has only the incidental effect of
benefiting religious believers and institutions falls safely within
the limits of the establishment clause." 7 This rule of accommoda-
113. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21. See also Justice Brennan's concurrence in School
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-99 (1963).
114. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
115. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976).
116. See Petition for Certiorari at 1-3 (Mar. 1981). See especially id. at 3:
But it turns the First Amendment completely on its head to hold, as the Court of Ap-
peals did here, that the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from tailoring
its activities in otherwise unobjectionable ways-and in ways it might well have been
employed in this very case if religion had not been involved-so as to minimize the
Government's own positive inroads upon practices protected by the Free Exercise
Clause.
117. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Zorach
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tion is not, of course, unlimited; the three-part test most fully ar-
ticulated in Nyquist"*8 sets the outer limit for government accom-
modation under the establishment clause.
The Badoni court was simply wrong in its conclusion that gov-
ernment action to protect Navajo religious practices would have
converted the Monument into "a government-managed religious
shrine."119 The Nyquist test demonstrates' otherwise. As the
Navajo plaintiffs observed, "[T]he whole point is that Rainbow
Bridge is a religious shrine; it was that long before it was declared
to be a national monument."' 20 The court held that the accom-
modation that the Navajo requested would violate the second
prong of Nyquist, which prohibits government action that has a
primary effect of advancing one religion above all others. 12' The
second part of the Nyquist test, however, is framed in the alter-
native: The primary effect of the challenged government action
must neither advance nor inhibit religion. 2 The court loaded the
dice against the Navajo in its framing of the question. The gov-
ernment is now acting in a manner that impairs the practice of
the Navajo religion. Rather than ask whether acceding to the
Navajo request would implicate the government in action that has
as its primary effect the advancement of the Navajo religion, the
court should have inquired whether government refusal to modify
its injurious activity impermissibly inhibited the Navajo in the
free exercise of their religion. The trial court's factual findings,
which the appellate court accepted, make it abundantly clear that
the government action, or refusal to modify its action, fell short
of the standard set forth in the second part of the Nyquist test.
2
1
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), for il-
lustrative cases in which the Supreme Court has permitted local government to provide
certain services and benefits to parochial schools and their students in the face of
establishment clause challenges.
118. See Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
773 (1973). Under Nyquist, governmental action will survive an establishment clause
challenge if it can be shown that the action is motivated by a secular legislative purpose,
that its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and that it does not require
excessive government entanglement with religious institutions and practices.
119. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179.
120. Petition, supra note 116.
121. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179.
122. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773.
123. For a recent district court decision that follows Badoni and inappropriately ap-
plies the second part of the Nyquist test, see Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, No. 81-0841;
Navajo Medicinemen's Ass'n v. Block, No. 81-0493; Wilson v. Block, No. 81-0558, 8
I.L.R. 3073 (D.D.C., June 15, 1981), aff'd No. 81-1912 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 1983).
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The Public Forum Cases Misconstrued
The court held alternatively that regulations to protect Navajo
practitioners from intrusion by tourists would be an impermis-
sible burden on the right of those tourists to free access to the
Monument.' 2 4 In support of this proposition the court cited a
familiar line of freedom of assembly and freedom of expression
cases. '2 Implying that government regulation of the tourist
crowds at the Monument to minimize interference with the prac-
tice of the traditional Navajo religion would violate a first
amendment right of the tourists, the court insisted that the case
law supported such a proposition: "Government action has fre-
quently been invalidated when it has denied the exercise of First
Amendment rights compatible with public use."
'1 26
These cited cases, however, stand for a proposition quite con-
trary to that for which the court sought support. They stand in-
stead for the proposition that the public right to free access to
public forums must sometimes yield to the exercise of first
amendment rights. In other words, these cases present a cogent
argument for government intervention to protect the Navajo in
their efforts to exercise their first amendment right to practice
their religion. They do not support the government's refusal to
act in order to avoid interfering with a tenuous first amendment
right of tourists to the Monument.'" Such an accommodation
would not run afoul of the establishment clause. Indeed, read in
tandem, the religion clauses demand it. When government action
directly burdens the free exercise of a particular religion, the
government does not offer favored treatment to that religion
when it acts to lift that burden.' 8
By choosing to balance the constitutional equities in favor of
encouraging tourism, the court has effectively denied the Navajo
the practice of their traditional religion. The court framed a
choice between maintaining the Monument as a shrine or destroy-
ing it. Since it wrongly believed that the establishment clause of
the first amendment barred the government from acting to
preserve the Monument as a shrine, it voted for its destruction.
124. See note 108 supra.
125. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179, citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 384 U.S. 147, 152
(1969); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
320 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 271 (1951); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
126. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179.
127. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951).
128. See, e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
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III. The Illusory Protections of the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act
Indian plaintiffs in both Sequoyah129 and Badoni'30 invoked
the protection of the recently enacted American Indian Religious
Freedom Act. 13' In Sequoyah the court dismissed the Cherokee
claim under the Act as overborne by superseding legislation and
thus did not examine the substance of the Act.' 3 2 In Badoni the
court curtly refused even to consider the Navajo claims under the
Act.' 33 If the Act does not apply to the situations presented by
the Indian plaintiffs in Sequoyah and Badoni, it is difficult to im-
agine what import it might have beyond its praiseworthy but inef-
fective statement of policy and expression of good will. As the
following examination of the legislative history of the Act reveals,
Congress never seriously intended to put teeth into the Act.
Despite Senator Abourezk's protests, the executive branch took
the hint. It has not construed the Act to modify any existing state
or federal law,13 but has seen its purpose as merely to state
129. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1161.
130. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 180.
131. Act of Aug. 11, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (codified in part at 42
U.S.C. § 1996). See Appendix for full text.
132. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1161:
Relief under the . . .Act ... is foreclosed by a provision of the Energy and Water
Development Appropriation Bill, Pub. Law No. 96-69 .... "[Nlotwithstanding provi-
sions of 16 U.S.C., Chapter 35 [The Endangered Species Act] or any other law, the
Corporation [TVA] is authorized and directed to complete construction, operate, and
maintain the Tellico Dame . . . ." (Emphasis added.) No clearer congressional com-
mand is imaginable. No law is to stand in the way of the completion and operation of
the dam.
133. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 180: "But we do not have before us the constitutionality
of. . .[the Act] or of any action taken by defendants in alleged violation of them."
134. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 102, supra note 1, at 132-33 (colloquy between Larry
L. Simms, Office of the Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, and Senator Abourezk,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs):
Abourezk: What you are saying is, the administration-the Justice Department-would
not want to see Congress overrule anything that happened before. I don't have to tell
you that if Senate Joint Resolujion 102 passes, it does overrule anything previously
conflicting. Is that right?
Simms: Well, we are also here to find out what the intent is.... That is another thing
we are unclear about.
See also, e.g., President Jimmy Carter, Statement on Signing S.J. Res. 102 Into Law,
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1417-18 (Aug. 12, 1978): "This act is in no way intended to
alter that guarantee [to worship freely] or override existing laws. . . ." See also S. REP.
709, 1978, supra note 9, at 11 (statement by George Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Interior for Indian Affairs): "We recommend passage of Senate Joint Resolution
102 with clarifying language ... [which] would insure that no provision of the resolution
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federal policy and announce an agenda for administrative and
regulatory reform.'
35
In his statement before the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs, Larry L. Simms, an attorney from the Department of
Justice, raised the administration's concerns about what he iden-
tified as establishment clause and federalism problems with the
proposed Act. 136 Simms advanced an administration proposal
that Congress resolve the federalism problem and the question of
the status of prior conflicting legislation by inserting limiting
would be construed as amending existing law." See id. at 12 (conclusion of committee):
The resolution does direct the administration to change its regulations and enforcement
practices wherever necessary to protect and preserve native American religious cultural
rights and practices. If changes cannot be made consistent with present statutory intent,
then the President must report back to Congress his recommendations for changes in
existing law which will require further legislative action.
This conclusion comports substantially with the position taken by the Justice Department.
See id. at 11 (remarks by Larry L. Simms):
Where conflicts arise that cannot be resolved within the existing statutory framework
the proper course for the executive branch would be to seek legislation permitting Con-
gress to declare its intent with regard to the balance to be struck between preservation
of religious freedom and the achievement of the objectives of the specific programs in-
volved.
Congressman Udall, sponsor of the Act in the House, made it abundantly clear that
Congress intended to limit the authority of the Act. See 124 CONG. REC. H6871-73 (daily
ed. July 18, 1978):
It is not the intent of my bill to wipe out laws passed for the benefit of the general
public or to confer special religious rights on Indians .... It has no teeth in it. It is the
sense of the Congress . . . it is the Department's [of Justice] understanding that this
resolution ... does not change any existing State or Federal law. That, of course, is the
committee's understanding and intent.
See also, Indian Rights, supra note 2, at 141: "[The Act] does not seek to correct any ex-
press federal policy which infringes upon Indians' religious practices. Instead, it attempts
to rectify injustices which occurred from a lack of federal policy."
The United States Commission on Civil Rights has taken a similarly benign view of
the Act. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, AMERICAN INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTs HANDBOOK
(2d ed. 1980), at 6: "It is hoped [that] this process [specified in Section 2 of the Act] will
ensure that government policies and practices take into account and do not unnecessarily
interfere with Indian religious practices."
135. President Jimmy Carter, Statement, supra note 134, at 1417: "This legislation
sets forth the policy of the United States to protect and preserve the inherent right of
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiian people to believe, express, and ex-
ercise their traditional religions." See also American Indian Religious Freedom: Report to
Accompany H.J. Res. 738, H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978):
The purpose of House Joint Resolution 738. . .is to insure that the policies and pro-
cedures of various Federal agencies, as they may impact upon the exercise of traditional
Indian religious practices, are brought into compliance with the constitutional injunc-
tion that Congress shall make no laws abridging the free exercise of religion.
136. S. REP. 709, 1978, supra note 9, at 10-11 (statement of Larry L. Simms).
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language into section 2 of the Act'37 and adding a third section.'38
Though the Committee accepted neither amendment, it appears
to have accepted the sense of the amendments as part of the
Act.'39 The Conunittee closed its report with the following find-
ing: "In compliance with subsection 4 of rule XXIX of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee notes that no
changes in existing law are made by Senate Joint Resolution 102
as reported."'' 4 0 It thus required no leap of the judicial imagina-
tion for the Badoni and Sequoyah courts to find that the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act had no bearing on the
resolution of the free exercise claims advanced by the Indian
plaintiffs. Congress's toothless expression of special concern for
problems of Indian access to sacred sites, precisely the problem
addressed in both Sequoyah and Badoni, was insufficient.' 4'
Simms also expressed the Justice Department's concern that
the Act might pose establishment clause problems, suggesting
that the Act might be read so as "to give preferential treatment to
Indian religious freedom beyond that afforded to other non-
Indian religions."'4 2 However, Simms did not offer any concrete
examples as to how this concern of the Justice Department might
materialize.
137. Id. at 11: "We would suggest that section 2 of the resolution be amended to read
as follows: '. . . to implement such changes as may be consistent with existing statutes.'"
(Emphasis added.)
138. Id.: "Section 3. Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as affecting any
provision of State or Federal law."
139. See supra text accompanying notes 134-135.
140. S. REP. 709, 1978, supra note 9, at 12.
141. See id. at 2-3:
The first restrictions are denials of access to Indians to certain physical locations.
Often, these locations include certain sites ... which are sacred to Indian religions ....
To deny access to them is analogous to preventing a non-Indian from entering his
church or temple . . . . Federal agencies such. as the Forest Service, Park Service,
Bureau of Land Management, and others have prevented Indians in certain cases from
entering onto these lands. The issue is not ownership or protection of the lands in-
volved. Rather, it is a straightforward question of access in order to worship and per-
form the necessary rites.
142. See id. at 10:
This is not to say that the unique characteristics of Indian religious practices may not
call for and permit accommodations different from those reached with respect to non-
Indian religions. It is to say that there may be some situations in which a conscious
preference accorded to some Indian religious practices [may] raise establishment clause
and due process clause problems.
Apparently the Justice Department is willing to recognize the rule of free exercise accom-
modation. However, for reasons that are not apparent, Simms cites Kennedy v.
B.N.D.D., 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1972), to support his establishment clause concerns.
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The Committee responded by clarifying its purpose: "[The
Act] is in no way intended to provide Indian religions with a
more favorable status than other religions, only to insure that the
U.S. Government treats them equally."''
Congress could not attempt to create by statute an exemption
from the establishment clause strictures of the first amendment.'
44
The only reported decision that deals with the substance of the
Act takes precisely this position.'
45
The draftsmen of the Task Force Report'" were sensitive to
the possibility of establishment clause challenges to the Act, as
well as challenges to the administrative and legislative action that
would be taken pursuant to the Act. The Report's first defense
against such challenges, however, reveals only a superficial under-
standing of the implications of the establishment clause:
The establishment of a religion is not a problem when
viewed from within the tribal context . . . .Establishment is
fundamentally the imposition by the political institution of
forms of belief and practice which are in conflict with or are
distasteful to people of a different tradition. Protecting Indian
religious practices from curiosity seekers, casual observers, and
administrative rules and regulations is the only practical way
that religious freedom can be assured to Indian Tribes and
Native groups. It is not the establishment of their religion
because their religions, not being proselytizing religions, seek
to preserve the ceremonies, rituals and beliefs, not to spread
them. "
143. S. REP. 709, 1978, supra note 9, at 6.
144. But cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Cox, The Supreme Court,
1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
145. See Navajo Medicinemen's Ass'n v. Block, No. 81-0493, 8 I.L.R. 3073, 3076
(D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff'd, No. 81-1912 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 1983). The court stated
that the Act is a guarantee of first amendment rights of American Indians and does not
grant any rights not already found in the amendment. Once again, Indian plaintiffs lost a
land access question, with the court holding that the Act does not require that access to
publicly owned property be granted to Indians without consideration for other users or
activities (in this case the development of the Snow Bowl ski resort in the sacred San
Francisco Peaks area of Arizona).
See also U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service, Chief's Decision on Request for
Administrative Review of Southwestern Regional Forester's Decision Involving Arizona
Snow Bowl Skiing Facilities and the Snow Bowl Road, Coconino National Forest, 8
I.L.R. 5011 (Dept. of Agric., Dec. 31, 1980).
146. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3.
147. Id. at 12.
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The Report suggests that only proselytizing religions can be
"established" by government action. But the government cannot
offer support to a religion without violating the establishment
clause under the rule of Nyquist.'I8 The Report offers no further
establishment clause analysis, but merely reiterates that establish-
ment clause strictures do not apply to traditional Indian religion:
Protecting the boundaries of state and church are certainly
important, but to guarantee religious freedom to American In-
dians does not necessarily mean the establishment of tradi-
tional Native religions over and above other religions .... It is
possible to state that traditional Native religions have little
chance of creating a national crisis in the church-state relation-
ship. 1
49
[The Act] does not constitute the establishment of a religion.
The premises of Native tribal religions differ so fundamentally
from the religions of the majority in perspective and practice
that the traditional dangers against which the establishment
clause guards do not exist.'5 0
Whether this is in fact true remains to be seen, since Navajo
Medicinemen's Association' is the only reported federal court
decision which addresses the substance of the Act. Given the ex-
treme caution revealed by the legislative history, 1 2 it seems
unlikely that any agency of the federal government will seek to
apply the Act in a controversial manner and thereby pose any dif-
ficult constitutional questions. Rather, the Act will more prob-
ably remain a benign statement of government policy and a direc-
tion to federal agencies to examine carefully their policies, regula-
tions, and procedures which may have an impact on the practice
of traditional American Indian religions.'
Conclusion: A Proposal for Judicial Candor
Both Badoni and Sequoyah offer unprincipled resolutions of
difficult and troubling situations in which government action has
severely impaired the ability of American Indians to practice their
148. 413 U.S. 756.
149. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 89 and 98.
150. Id.
151. Navajo Medicinemen's Ass'n v. Block, No. 81-0493, 8 I.L.R. 3073, 3076
(D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff'd, No. 81-1912 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 1983).
152. See supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
153. See American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Act of Aug. 11, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-341, 92 Stat. 469, § 2 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996). See Appendix for full text.
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traditional tribal religions. Neither court advances first amend-
ment jurisprudence in its analysis. Relying on a dubious "central-
ity" test, the Sequoyah court wrongly found that the Cherokee
had failed to state a religious claim under the free exercise clause
of the first amendment. The Badoni court assumed that com-
peting interests would have outweighed any religious interests the
Navajo might have asserted. It therefore declined to analyze the
religious interest the Navajo had alleged. The court buttressed its
holding with a poorly reasoned establishment clause attack on the
Navajos' argument. Both courts affirmed summary judgments,
foreclosing any possibility of an evidentiary hearing on factual
matters relating to the Indians' claims. Neither decision offers
any concrete guidance on the difficult free exercise issues these
cases present. It still remains for a federal court to admit candidly
that massive federal water projects that affect millions of people
and large sections of the country will consistently weigh more
heavily in the balance than the competing religious claims of
isolated groups of American Indians. The historical inevitability
of this result will not make the underlying hierarchy of values any
more palatable.
Unfortunately, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
will likely continue to provide little aid to Indian plaintiffs such
as those in Sequoyah and Badoni. Perhaps the Act will remind
government officials responsible for formulating and applying the
rules, regulations, and procedures of federal administrative agen-
cies to be more solicitous of Indian religious interests. But the
Act, an impotent statement of good intentions, will have no im-
pact on the power relationship between white society and Indian
society that is at the core of the problems relating to traditional
Indian religious practice.
(Appendix follows)
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Appendix
American Indian Religious Freedom Act:




American Indian Religious Freedom.
Whereas the freedom of religion for all people is an inherent right, fundamental
to the democratic structure of the United States and is guaranteed by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution:
Whereas the United States has traditionally rejected the concept of a govern-
ment denying individuals the right to practice their religion and, as a result,
has benefited from a rich variety of religious heritages in this country;
Whereas the religious practices of the American Indian (as well as Native Alas-
kan and Hawaiian) are an integral part of their culture, tradition and heritage,
such practices forming the basis of Indian identity and value systems;
Whereas the traditional American Indian religions, as an integral part of Indian
life, are indispensable and irreplaceable;
Whereas the lack of a clear, comprehensive, and consistent Federal policy has
often resulted in the abridgment of religious freedom for traditional American
Indians;
Whereas such religious infringements result from the lack of knowledge or the
insensitive and inflexible enforcement of Federal policies and regulations pre-
mised on a variety of laws;
Whereas such laws were designed for such worthwhile purposes as conservation
and preservation of natural species and resources but were never intended to
relate to Indian religious practices and, therefore, were passed without consid-
eration of their effect on traditional American Indian religions;
Whereas such laws and policies often deny American Indians access to sacred
sites required in their religions, including cemeteries;
Whereas such laws at times prohibit the use and possession of sacred objects
necessary to the exercise of religious rites and ceremonies;
Whereas traditional American Indian ceremonies have been intruded upon, in-
terfered with, and in a few instances banned: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That henceforth it shall be the policy of the
United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right
of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not
limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom
to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
SEC. 2. The President shall direct the various Federal departments, agencies,
and other instrumentalities responsible for administering relevant laws to
evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation with native traditional
religious leaders in order to determine appropriate changes necessary to protect
and preserve Native American religious cultural rights and practices. Twelve
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months after approval of this resolution, the President shall report back to the
Congress the results of his evaluation, including any changes which were made
in administrative policies and procedures, and any recommendations he may
have for legislative action.
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